What would happen to our understanding of international law and its relationship with violence if we collapsed the distinction between our supposedly post-colonial 'present' and its colonial 'past'; between the sovereign spaces of the twenty-first century global order, and the integrated, hierarchical space of fascist imperialism? I respond to this question through an investigation into the physical contours of a precise 'imperial location': 30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E. These coordinates refer to a point on the sea-edge of the Sirtica that is occupied, today, by the Ra's Lanuf oil refinery, one of Libya's three most important such facilities. In the late-1930s, however, during Libya's period of fascist colonial rule, this was the spot at which a state-of-the-art motorway, the Via litoranea libica, was crossed by a giant triumphal arch, the Arco dei Fileni. Through a chronotopic reading of the temporal, spatial and interpellative aspects of this point, its architecture and its history, I suggest that fascist lawyers, officials and intellectuals accepted an unfortunate truth about the relationship between international law and violence -a relationship that twenty-first century doctrinal international law is loath to confront. This truth concerns the inherently expansionist logic of the sovereign state, and the inevitably hierarchical ordering of the 'international community' which stems from it.
as a road to encourage the motoring tourist'. 5 The Arch complemented this monumentalisation of Policy, 1914 Policy, -1937 Policy, (1938 Agreement', now also based in Tripoli. 11 For example, Hafta's LNA is (generally) supported by the House of Representatives -in theory (not in practice) the legislative arm of the GNA. Many of these militias also have external backing. For instance, in September 2016, Dignity forces seized back control of the refinery from the PFG supported by Egyptian and UAE airstrikes, 12 and Russia is liaising with Haftar directly, 13 in spite the latter's vociferous opposition to the Skhirat Agreement. 14 The US has been launching regular airstrikes in Libya against 'IS militants' since August 2016. 15 In the midst of this confusion of conflicting jurisdictional claims and aerial bombardment, it is difficult to confirm whether the bumps in the tarmac left by the remnants of the Arch are still visible. So, what are scholars of international law to make of the fact that these two structures -on the one hand, a monument to the opening of a road symbolising the integration and militarisation of a fascist colony on the one hand; on the other, an oil refinery at the centre of a civil conflict which 11 has erupted in the wake of an international intervention executed by the self-styled agents of humanity's 'protection' -occurred, more than eight decades apart, in exactly the same 'location'?
The answer is not straightforward.
On the one hand, international law's core doctrines are inclined to assure us that this is nothing but a coincidence: 30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E (1937) and 30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E (today) might be identical in spatial terms, these doctrines suggest, but time holds them safely apart. To give just a few illustrations, the doctrine of sovereign equality (as rearticulated in Resolution 1973) insists that international law is founded on a 'strong commitment' to the 'sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity' of all states. 16 Similarly, the doctrine of the non-use of force is often traced to the defeat of official fascism in 1945, together with its efforts to justify the use of force on the basis of the need for spazzio vitale or Lebensraum ('living space'). 17 Equally, the emergence of the nowcustomary right of 'all peoples' to self-determination in the 1960s and 70s is understood to have rendered colonialism unlawful in much the same way as fascist expansionism did. 18 As these illustrations indicate, from a doctrinal perspective the progress of international law away from territorial expansionism (whether fascist or colonial) and towards sovereign equality has been such that the 'present' conflict in Libya (an independent state since 1951) can be assumed to be wholly unconnected with the 'historical' phenomenon of fascist imperialism.
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On the other hand, however, our faith (as scholars of international law) in the idea that international law's trajectory will inevitably be 'progressive' is not what it once was. Official bodies like the International Court of Justice continue to go about their work of deriving the current state of international law from the sources laid down by Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. Yet that method has been subjected to a thoroughgoing critique in recent years. That critique has taken on an important temporal dimension, with scholars seeking not only to contextualise international law's 'evolution' (for example, by drawing out the discipline's colonial origins) but also to bring those 'past' origins to bear on international law's ostensibly post-colonial 'present'. 20 With this, critical scholars are increasingly challenging both the teleological temporality of doctrinal international law (the idea that the more international law we have, the better the world will be) and the historicist temporality of mainstream history (generally suspicious of any effort that might be construed as sullying the 16 Res. remnants of yesterday with the concerns of today). 21 From the perspective of this new, critical international legal temporality -far more elastic than either of its linear (teleological and historicist) counterparts -to insist that two events are necessarily held apart by a distinction between 'past' and 'present' is, indeed, a product of ideology. 22 The same, indeed, might be said about the spatiality of international law. Where the doctrine tends to narrate the division of the world into a series of formally equal states simply as a fact of life, if not as an inevitable and inherently emancipatory development, critical scholars of international law, and Indigenous scholars in particular, have challenged this assumption that statehood is a neutral, natural and universal way to organise collective life. 23 Building on this body of scholarship, the question I want to explore in this essay is what would happen if we were to collapse the distinction between the (post-colonial) 'present' and (colonial)
'past' -and between 'sovereign' and 'imperial' space -in relation, specifically, to fascist colonialism?
My jumping-off point, here, concerns the situation, both paradoxical and catastrophic, which began to unfold with the passage of Resolution 1973, under the aegis of which the 'international community' authorised the sacrifice of (in the end) between 10,000 and 25,000 Libyan lives in the name of their own 'protection'. 24 Rather than approaching international legality as something that regulates the relations among a set of bounded jurisdictions know as states (together with certain other 'international personalities'), I will read international law here as something that can (still) be found embedded in, and rebounding from, the physicality of a particular location, contributing to the constitution of particular kinds of subjectivity. This location I will examine here is, of course, point 30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E, home of the former Arch, of the still-existent Ra's Lanuf refinery, and of their tenacious companion, the Litoranea/Libyan Coastal Highway.
The approach I develop here in order to respond to this question is at once materialist and chronotopic. Regarding the first, I follow my co-contributor Luis Eslava in understanding the normative force of international law to be something that operates not only through in its documents and institutions, but also through the physical contours of our daily existence: the design of our homes; the materials of which our monuments are constructed; animals and vehicles which carry us about; the fabric of our clothes; the sandiness or otherwise of our soil. 25 Regarding the second, I
follow the linguistic philosopher and semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin in understanding subjectivity as a function of the narrative relationship between time and space. 26 Bringing these two approaches together, the task of this article will be to work out what kinds of subjects the materiality of point 30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E produced in the 1930s, and what kinds of subjects it continues to produce today. In Section 1, I focus on the temporality of this location. In Section 2, I address its spatiality.
In Section 3, turn to the question of subjectivity. Somewhat disconcertingly, the results produced by this approach suggest that fascism's understanding of self-determining subjectivity ('sovereignty') as inherently expansionist, hierarchical and violent may have been more accurate than its liberal counterpart, more familiar to doctrinal international law today. Uncomfortable as this suggestion may be, however, it does a certain kind of light on the otherwise puzzling tendency of an international legal order committed to the development of 'friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples' to promote violence rather than to prevent it. 27 1. Time.
As its location and aesthetics proclaimed, the Arco dei Fileni was intended to symbolise Italy's right to traverse, at will, a frontier that was at once political and temporal. Libya's Cyrenaica-Tripolitania boundary had itself been superimposed on top of the ancient border between the Phoenician colony of Carthage (founded in 814 or 815 BCE) and the Greek colony of Cyrene (founded in 630 BCE).
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It was the memory of ancient border that the Arch's two eponymous figures, cast in bronze and lodged in its attic (see Fig. 2 ), were intended to evoke. The legend of that desert frontier is described by Though hardly 'functionalist', the Arco dei Fileni did have a function, however: that of marking the border between the two coastal regions which the Litorana Libica hemmed together. When observed (as it would have been) in conjunction with this motorway, therefore, the Arch's otherwise retrospective sense of direction must have clashed spectacularly with the road's undeniably high-tech, futuristic orientation. Such an orientation was, of course, no less in keeping with the aesthetics and politics of Italian fascism than its neo-classical inclinations. Just as they sought to 'trim the bourgeois fat' from the bodies and minds of Italians, so the ideologues and institutions of the Mussolini regime sought to eliminate all that was 'barbaric' and 'decadent' about the previous era.
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The Duce frequently referred, for example, to the 'stale breath of the past', 'exhaled' by the institutions of parliamentary democracy, 46 going so far as to recalibrate the calendar to begin on 29
October 1922, the day after the March on Rome. 47 Indeed, as historians of art, in particular, have pointed out, far from being a contradiction, this juxtaposition of past and present was a distinctive and politically highly-charged element of fascist aesthetics. As the art historian Mark Antliff argues, citing many other examples of this combination, fascism's 'rejenerative nationalism' was notably 'Janus-faced':
[T]o reinvigorate the body politic, fascists looked beyond a decadent present to past eras, but they did not advocate a nostalgic return to, say, the era of Imperial
Rome. Instead, they sought to incorporate qualities associated with past eras into the creation of a radically new society, fully integrated with twentieth-century industrialism and technology. In Sorelian fashion, selective moments from a nation's historical past were utilized for their mythic appeal as a catalyst for the radical transformation of present society. The road also decimated the journey-time between Tripoli and Benghazi, replacing the painfully long voyage by fortnightly steamer, 56 accelerating the redeployment of troops, and bringing ever closer the exhilarating prospect of war -'the world's only hygiene', according to the Futurist mantra.
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Perhaps most importantly, the Litoranea's high-speed penetration of the Arch invoked precisely the transformative capacity for 'intuition' that both Futurism and fascism valued so highly in the aggressive, muscular, male subjects of their common imagination. '
[O]ur slim peninsula', he wrote, 'is swollen with creative genius, and has the right to govern the world'.
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The Litoranea, then, embodied precisely the accelerated expansionism and murderous attitude to 'tradition' so beloved of Futurism, and so influential for the political aesthetics of fascism.
As the avenue through which the agents of Italian authority crossed the colony at a mechanical velocity which ploughed straight through any putative camel caravan, the road was clearly designed -among more obvious functions -to encourage Libya's native inhabitants to internalise the 'truth'
of their supposedly anachronistic way of life, and of the futility of resisting their incorporation, both psychic and somatic, into the fascist imperial order. 70 This powerful maternal figure, Pascoli declared, had at last 'found a place' for the workers she was being forced to send abroad: 'a vast region bathed by our sea'. 71 which it disappeared as they sped away along the smooth new asphalt. The message -that of the absolute superiority of the collective over the individual -was clear. 98 Kenrick, supra note 6, at 156. 99 G. P. Callegari, I villaggi libici (1941), 32-36, quoted in Fuller, supra note 33, at 184.
Subjectivity
The first two sections of this article have unpacked some of the ways in which fascist legality was expressed in and reflected back from the physicality of colonial Libya, and from the intersection between the Arch and the road specifically. We have seen how the passage through the Arch was, like so much of fascist life, a carefully staged experience, designed to reinforce the juridical changes though which the Mussolini regime was then attempting to create a new set of hierarchically-ordered, synthetic legal subjectivities for Libya, Italy, and the world at large. On the surface, then, fascism's peculiarly 'monist' approach to law (international, colonial and domestic) could not be more distinct from doctrinal international legal thinking today, grounded as the latter is continues to be in a formally equal notion of subjectivity operating through a set of separate but equivalent scales ('sovereign'
states, 'self-determining' peoples, individual bearers of 'universal human rights' and so on). 100 If this is the case, we might ask whether fascism's experiments have anything at all to tell us about the relationship between doctrinal international law today and the kind of violence which Libya has been forced to experience on its path away from fascist colonialism towards 'sovereign statehood'?
I will use this section to suggest that, for all its pomposity and viciousness, fascism's officials, lawyers and philosophers accepted a truth about the concept of self-determining subjectivity or 'sovereignty', its logic and its material effects -a logic which present-day doctrinal international law Transposing this theory of individual subjectivity to the international realm, fascist jurists and diplomats embarked on the project of reorganising the global order along hierarchical lines just as
Italian society was being reorgnaised domestically. 108 Prior to its withdrawal from the League of juridical parity among all States', as codified in the Covenant, 109 on the grounds that states were 'differentiated…by their historical responsibilities'. 110 Only if the League were 'properly directed by a master hand' would it 'rise from its present impotence to give decisiveness and prestige to itself and tranquility to the international system'. 111 Having failed in its efforts to 'reform' the League (which it abandoned in 1937 in the wake of the 'Abyssinia Crisis'), Italy attempted to bring this new, that 'in order to save the forty million inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands for settling the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in factories and mines', 116 he only articulated, for Britain, something that was obvious to all of Europe's imperial 'sovereign equals'. 117 The legitimising rationale of fascist expansionism was, in other words, identical to that of European imperialism, but for one thing:
fascism's willingness to annex 'sovereign', European territory (as well as less-than-sovereign, extraEuropean territory) in order to obtain the resources deemed 'vital' to its continued existence. With this willingness, fascism manifested its contempt not only for the axiom of sovereign equality but also for the international law's 'unrealistic' Europhilism. 118 It also shattered the white supremacism which underpinned the European colonial project into a far more complex but equally brutal hierarchy of racial supremacy, according not only Africans, Arabs and Indigenous peoples but also European Jews, Slavs, Roma and others could legitimately be subordinated and, if necessary, liquidated. 119 Today, by contrast, and as noted at the start, colonialism is considered wholly illegitimate as a matter of international law. 120 However, the arrival of the customary right of peoples to selfdetermination in the late-twentieth century meant that satiating the 'vital needs' of a state's increasingly numerous or wealthy population (more commonly referred to, today, in terms of a healthily expanding 'domestic market') by means of territorial expansion is no longer a legitimate option (whether beyond or within Europe), the same does not apply when it comes to the state's right to capture of resources other than land for the same purpose. On the contrary, the idea that an available 'supply' of 'natural resources' coupled with the 'demand' associated with a national . 121 Only the most powerful states -those with the biggest 'markets' and the largest reservoirs of resources -can get away with resisting some of the rules they so rigorously enforce amongst their peers.
122
Approached from a twenty-first century doctrinal starting-point, the inexorably expansionist logic (from colonialism to neo-colonialism) of international law's core subject, the self-determining or sovereign state, is difficult to see. According to the treaties, custom and case law that regulate the coming-into-being and 'intercourse' of states under international law, it is simply a fact of life in the 'internationa community' that some communities happen to be sovereign states, possessed of an 'external' right to self-determination, while others just happen to exist within theose states, protected by the 'internal' equivalent of that right. 123 With these rights in place, borders can be assumed to remain 'defined', populations 'permanent', and states 'peace-loving' at heart. 124 In practice, however, the pattern according to which rights of 'external' and 'internal' self-determination have come to be distributed among the world's communities and territoires is neither random nor neutral. Instead (as Marxist, 'Third World', Indigenous, queer and feminist legal scholars continue to argue), this pattern has been determined, over the course of five centuries, by the accumulation and distribution of resources -most obviously, 'natural', economic, financial and technical resources, but also, and just as importantly, the many other forms of epistemological capital (as we might call it), deriving from the racist, gendered, heteronormative and other discriminatory structures which continue to order our everyday lives.
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What a chronotopic investigation into fascist material practices of colonialism and international law contributes to this critique is a slight change in focus, from the origins of inequality to its mechanisms of perpetuation. In a world in which the only subjective relationship with any normative value is that between the individual and the state (conceived as a macro individual), there is, after all, only one way to overcome the physical limit which death -mortality -places on 'true' selfdetermination. This is, of course, through the establishment of a 'bloodline': procreation; the founding of a family; then a tribe; then a 'nation' and ultimately the formation of a nation-state. This means, of course, that the extension of self-determining subjectivity in time must go hand-in-hand with the expansion of self-determining subjectivity in space, as generations multiply and begin to find themselves in competition for resources. This trajectory, with its 'survival of the fittest' logic, was axiomatic for Mussolini, Boccioni, Rhodes -for inter-war Futurists and fascists and pre-war imperialists generally, as we have seen.
But which view is correct? Is the 'international community' a stable global patchwork collection of sovereign equals, comfortably producing and exchanging resources with one another in order to 
